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THE IMMUNITY OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL
Public officials are generally accorded some type
of immunity from civil damage actions resulting
from their performance of official functions.' The
doctrine of immunity is based on the principle that
it is unjust to punish a public official who has
attempted to perform his job in good faith. Moreover, there is a fear that unlimited liability will
prevent a public official from properly performing
his functions. 2 Public officials, either state or federal, can receive one of two types of immunity.
Officials performingjudicial or quasi-judicial functions are accorded absolute immunity that completely bars suits against them for actions taken
within the scope of their office.3 Other officials
receive qualified immunity that only protects them
against suits based on errors made in good faith; a
cause of action still lies if the official makes an
intentional or malicious error.4
In determining the scope of immunity applicable
to the United States Attorney General, courts have
looked primarily to the case law concerning
prosecutorial immunity. 5 This is not surprising in
light of the similarity between the functions of the6
United States Attorney General and a prosecutor.
'See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 987 (4th ed.
1971).
2
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).

'See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978).
' See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974).
5
See Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir.
1979); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In
determining the scope of immunity accorded prosecutors,
courts can look both to cases brought against state prosecutors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) as well as to
constitutional actions brought against federal prosecutors. The immunity accorded to state officials is equivalent to that accorded to their federal counterparts. Butz
v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478 (1978).
6
The United States Attorney General has far greater
duties than an ordinary prosecutor. He must, for example, give legal advice to the President and other branches
of the government and publish and distribute his opin-

The Supreme Court has yet to decide a case concerning the scope of immunity applicable to the
United States Attorney General, but the Court has
begun to outline the contours of prosecutorial im7
munity. In Imbler v. Pachtman the Court held that
"in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the
State's case" a prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer
and thus absolutely immune from suit. But this
case only answered part of the question as the
Court did not rule on the proper scope of immunity
applicable to a prosecutor acting as an investigator
rather than as an advocate.
Most courts, both before and after Imbler, have
held that when a prosecutor acts as an administrator or as an investigator, he receives only a qualified
immunity.8 But the courts that have made this
ions. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 511-513, 521 (1976). But the basic
activities of the United States Attorney General, like all
other prosecutors, consist of investigating crime and initiating prosecutions. Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 515, 518, 519,
533 (1976) with H. KERPER, INTRODUCTION TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 432-34 (1972). It should be noted
that the only cases decided on the question of the scope
of immunity of the United States Attorney General have
involved activities that all prosecutors would undertake.
See Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979)
(ordering an investigation); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d
83 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (arrest, detention and prosecution).
It is likely that at some point there will be civil suits
challenging the legality of activities unique to the United
States Attorney General which cannot be analogized to
prosecutorial immunity.
7 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).
'See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 21 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1256 (1st Cir.
1974); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608
(7th Cir. 1973); Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 410
(7th Cir. 1972); Dodd v. Spokane County, 393 F.2d 330,
335 (9th Cir. 1968); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533,
536-37 (9th Cir. 1965); Tomko v. Lees, 416 F. Supp.
1137, 1139 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
There are cases that have not drawn the line between
investigative and administrative activities as opposed to
advocacy activities. But these cases have not used the
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distinction seem to ignore a footnote at the end of
the Imbler majority opinion in which the Court
noted:
We recognize that the duties of the prosecutor in
his role as advocate for the State involve actions
preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and
actions apart from the courtroom. A prosecuting
attorney is required.., to make decisions on a wide
variety of sensitive issues. These include questions
of whether to present a case to a grand jury, whether
to file an information, whether and when to prosecute, whether to dismiss an indictment against particular defendants, which witnesses to call, and what
other evidence to present. Preparation, both for the
initiation of the criminal process and for a trial,
may require the obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating of evidence. At some point, and with respect to
some decisions, the prosecutor no doubt functions
as an administrator rather than as an officer of the
court. Drawing a proper line between these functions may present difficult questions, but this case
9
does not require us to anticipate them.
This footnote implies that obtaining evidence may,
in some circumstances, be a quasi-judicial activity
which should be accorded an absolute immunity.
In a recent opinion by the Third Circuit, Forsyth
0
v. Kleindienst,' the court used this footnote as the
basis for its holding that any investigative activity
of the Attorney General conducted for the purpose
of gathering information "necessary to a prosecutor's decision to initiate a criminal prosecution" is
absolutely immune from civil suit.t Although this
holding appears to follow logically from the footnote in Imbler, a closer analysis of the Forsyth rule
will reveal that it is both unsound and unworkable.
The rule, which focuses on the purpose of the
investigative activity as a basis for the determination of the scope of immunity to be afforded, will
force trial courts to undertake a difficult motive
analysis. Furthermore, the distinction drawn by
the court is unsupported by the policy considerations underlying the doctrine of absolute immunity.
proper analysis. In Imbler the Court rejected all approaches other than a functional analysis in which the
scope of immunity is determined by the nature of the
function being performed. Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S.
409 (1976). See Hillard v. Williams, 516 F.2d 1344 (6th
Cir. 1975), vacated and remandedin light ofImbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 961, rev'don remand, 540 F.2d 220 (6th Cir.
1976) (scope of prosecutor's immunity based on the legality or illegality of his actions).
11424 U.S. at 431 n.33.
'0 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 1215.

The Forsyth case was an appeal from two separate
actions 12 brought against several former Attorneys
General, two Directors of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and several FBI agents. Both suits
sought damages for allegedly illegal wiretaps that
were ordered by the Department ofJustice without
first obtaining a search warrant. The warrantless
wiretaps were ordered in 1971, which was before
the Supreme Court held in United States v. United
States District Court13 that most wiretaps required
prior judicial approval. The plaintiffs in both cases
asserted a cause of action under the first, fourth,
sixth and ninth amendments to the Constitution
and 18 U.S.C. § 2520.1' The defendants moved for
summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to absolute immunity. Both of the district
courts denied the motions for summary judgment
and held that the defendants were entitled to only
qualified immunity for ordering wiretaps.' 5 The
Forsyth case is a consolidated appeal of the two
denials of summary judgment. 16 The court's opinion was limited to a discussion of the type of
immunity appropriate for the Attorney General. 7
The Forsyth court held that Imbler required a
functional analysis of the immunity question. The
immunity of a public official should be determined
by the functions he performs, rather than by his
"status or title."' I In undertaking certain activities,
a prosecutor functions as an officer of the court
(quasi-judicial officer) and, like a judge, should
receive absolute immunity. But in performing certain other functions, the prosecutor no longer acts
as a quasi-judicial officer and should only receive
qualified immunity. The Forsyth court noted that
although the Supreme Court in Imbler left the
precise borderline between these areas undefined,
,2Burkhart v. Saxbe, 448 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 447 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
13 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
,418 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976).
15448 F. Supp. at 588; 447 F. Supp. at 192.
is Denial of a summary judgment is appealable as a
final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) when it involves
a right that is separate from and collateral to the rights
asserted in the action. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). The Forsyth court
permitted the appeals because part of the purpose of
absolute immunity is the right not to be subjected to
trial. This right is lost if the denial of summary judgment
is not independently appealable. 599 F.2d at 1207-09.
7
The court did not discuss any of the other defendants, except for the FBI agents, because of their nominal
connection with the case. 599 F.2d at 1209 n.6. The court
did briefly discuss the immunity of the FBI agents, id. at
1216-17, but a discussion of this issue is beyond the scope
of this recent trend.
'8 Id. at 1212.

NOTES
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at least one point was clear; the decision to initiate General himself. But the Attorney General's testia prosecution is a quasi-judicial activity that is mony regarding his intention will rarely be useful
absolutely immune from suit.' 9 The court then because he will be facing a possible damage judgdrew the conclusion that since "the decision ... to ment and will have an interest in establishing the
initiate a prosecution is not made in a vacuum,"
motive most favorable to himself. Courts will thus
subjecting the Attorney General to liability for be forced to make a generalized inquiry into the
gathering the information necessary to make such circumstances surrounding an investigation in an
a decision could only "foster uninformed decision- attempt to determine the purpose of the investimaking.' 20 Based solely on this consideration, the gation. This will probably produce a situation in
Forsyth court extended the absolute immunity of a which trial courts will weigh the strength of the
prosecutor to investigative activities closely related evidence in the possession of the Attorney General
to the decision to initiate a prosecution. Both cases before he ordered the investigation and then make
were remanded to the district courts for a factual their own determinations of whether a prosecution
hearing to determine the nature of the investiga- was being contemplated.
tions for which the wiretaps were used.21
Motive determinations are, of course, not impossible. Legal principles should not be discarded
PRAGMATIC PROBLEMS
simply because they are difficult to apply. But
The Forsyth decision attempts to distinguish two given the difficulties involved in using a motivetypes of investigations: those investigations specif- based standard, the Forsyth rule can only be justified if it is solidly supported by the relevant policy
ically related to the decision to initiate a particular
prosecution (specific investigations) as opposed to considerations. The Forsythcourt's decision presents
the more general type of investigations which are an unworkable rule, however, because in addition
not specifically directed toward an anticipated to the pragmatic problems that it presents, it is
prosecution (general investigations). 22 The distinc- unsupported by the policy considerations undertion drawn by the court essentially leads to a lying the doctrine of immunity.
motive analysis; the trial court will be required to
THEORETICAL PROBLEMS
determine why the Attorney General ordered a
particular investigation. This inquiry into motive
The Forsyth court gave absolute immunity to
is the inevitable outcome of the Forsyth rule because certain types of investigations in order to avoid a
the same act of investigation, wiretapping, can situation that would promote uninformed decisionreceive a different degree of immunity depending making.H Unfortunately, this is a conclusory raupon how the Attorney General intended to use tionale that does not answer the crucial question.
the information gathered by the investigation.
It is not likely to be disputed that a prosecutor
It must be emphasized that in a Forsyth situation, needs to be immune from suits based upon his
the plaintiffs are challenging the order to investi- investigative activity, but the real question is why
gate.2 How the information is actually used once was qualified immunity deemed insufficient prothe investigation is completed is only circumstan- tection? Police officers, for example, are constantly
tial evidence of whether the order was a quasi- called upon to make difficult decisions in the course
judicial activity. For example, an investigation un- of investigations, yet they are only accorded qualdertaken with a firm intent to bring legal action
ified immunity. Since the court provides no permay turn up evidence that forces a decision not to suasive rationale for its extension of immunity, a
prosecute, whereas a general investigation may full analysis of the Forsyth holding will first require
turn up evidence that leads to a prosecution. Thus a determination of what policy considerations are
the trial court cannot rely heavily on whether there required to justify a grant of absolute immunity.
was in fact a prosecution in making its determiThe doctrine of absolute immunity has its roots
nation of the purposes for which the investigation
in the common-law immunity that has always been
was ordered.
given to judges. In Bradley v. Fisher25 the Supreme
The only direct evidence of the Attorney Gen- Court discussed the major policy consideration
eral's intent would be the testimony of the Attorney underlying the doctrine of absolute immunity.
Bradley involved a situation where, at the end of a
' 9 Id. at 1213.
0
2 Id.at 1215.
trial, a judge accused one of the attorneys of har21Id. at 1217.
24Id. at 1215.
2Id.
at 1214-15.
23Id.at 1205.
2580 U.S. (13 Wall.)
335 (1872).
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assing the bench. The judge ordered the attorney's
name stricken from the list of attorneys permitted
to practice before that court. The Court held that
although the attorney should have been given a
chance to defend himself against the judge's accusations, the actions by the judge were well within
the improthe scope of his office and thus, despite
26
priety, absolutely immune from suit.

The main concern of the Bradley Court was the
threat of retaliatory suits by those dissatisfied with
a judge's decisions. The Court pointed out that
trials often involve "not merely great pecuniary
interests, but the liberty and character of the par' 27

ties."

The Court felt that these highly emotional

situations will frequently lead to retaliatory suits,
many of which will be frivolous. Without absolute
immunity from civil suits, a judge would not be
able to exercise the free and independent judgment
necessary to a fair trial.8 Thus the Court felt that
permitting any kind of suit against ajudge, including those based only on malicious actions, would29
have a detrimental effect on his job performance.
The doctrine of absolute immunity was extended
to prosecutors in Yaselli v. Goff.' The court held
that in bringing prosecutions, prosecutors act as
quasi-judicial officers and, like judges, are likely to
be subjected to a large number of retaliatory suits
in response to their decisions. The court noted, as
the Bradley Court had, that the propensity for
retaliatory suits may affect the job performance of
a quasi-judicial official. The court also noted an
additional problem which was likely to affect a
public officer who might be the target of a high
number of retaliatory suits. Even if it was obvious
that all of the suits would fail, "the most innocent
26 A judge's immunity, like any immunity, is limited
to those actions taken within the scope of his office: See
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,355-57 (1978); Lynch
v. lohnson, 420 F.2d 818, 821 (6th Cir. 1970).
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 348.
28 Id. at 347.
'The independence of the judiciary has always been
of special concern in the federal system. Article III of the
Constitution attempts to maintain this independence by

guaranteeing a lifetime appointment (barring bad behavior) and by preventing Congress from lowering judicial
salaries. These provisions received "almost complete assent" during the Constitutional Convention. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART &
WESCHLER'S, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTE.m 6-7 (2d ed. 1973).

30 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
Several lower courts had held that prosecutors could
receive an absolute immunity prior to this case, but this
was the first time the Supreme Court upheld this reasoning.

council might be unrighteously harassed with
suits." 3 ' The court was implying that a grant of
qualified immunity would not provide a sufficient
solution to the harassment problem. Qualified immunity requires a trial on the issue of good faith,
but absolute immunity will bar a suit on the basis
of the pleadings.3 2 Therefore, without absolute immunity, a public official who is likely to be the
subject of retaliatory suits will be prevented from
performing his job simply by the enormous amount
of time he may have to waste in court proving his
good faith.
The primary considerations underlying a grant
of absolute immunity are those discussed by the
Bradley and Yaselli courts. A public official whose
duties will generate a high number of retaliatory
suits may not be able to act effectively because of
fear of reprisal and because of the sheer amount of
time wasted defending suits. But the Supreme
Court has noted a third and crucial prophylactic
consideration which acts as a limitation on the
extension of immunity. In Imbler v. Pachiman the
Court noted the problems caused by retaliatory
suits, but also cautioned that a public officer should
only be granted absolute immunity when there are
other specific means of controlling his actions.3
The Court pointed out that in a trial situation, the
system of appellate review always constitutes a
check on the prosecutor's actions and thereby ensures the defendant a fair trial. In fact, the adversary nature of the trial itself ensures that all of a
prosecutor's actions will be subjected to close scrutiny.' In addition, a prosecutor's conduct can be
regulated by ethical proceedings under the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility.35 Thus the public has a viable means of
curtailing malicious conduct by a prosecutor without subjecting him to civil liability.
3' 12 F.2d at 402 (quoting Munster v. Lamb, 11 Q.B.D.

588).

32 See Dodd v. Spokane County, 393 F.2d 330,335 (9th
Cir. 1968) (case remanded to the district court because a
defense of good faith could not be determined from the
pleadings). See generally Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45-46 (1957) (a case cannot be dismissed on the pleadings
unless the plaintiff "can prove no set of facts in support

of his claim which would entitle him to relief").
3 See 424 U.S. at 428-29. The Court held that prosecutors, in bringing prosecutions, are absolutely immune
from civil suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). 424 U.S.
at 427.
-4424
2

U.S. at 427.

sId. at 429. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court

recently heard a case challenging a prosecutor's actions

at trial on ethical grounds. In re Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d 392,
392 N.E.2d 1333 (1979).

NOTES

The absolute immunity of judges and other
36
quasi-judicial officers should be contrasted with
the qualified immunity of police officers. Police
officers provide a good example of a public official
accorded only qualified immunity. In addition,
they perform many functions quite similar to, and
37
in close cooperation with, prosecutors. Police officers are accorded only a good faith immunity for
common-law actions as well as for suits under 42
U.S.C. § 1 9 8 3 .s8 Unfortunately, courts generally
approach the issue of the proper scope of immunity
for a police officer by questioning whether a police
officer should receive any immunity at all.39 While
there are no opinions which analyze the reasons
why a police officer should not receive absolute
immunity,40 an examination of the policy considerations underlying the doctrine of absolute immunity will reveal why this protection is withheld
from police officers.
A grant of absolute immunity is necessary only
when there is an unusually large threat of retaliatory suits and this only arises in litigation situations. 4' A police officer's actions may generate some
retaliatory action, but not with the same frequency
or vehemence of those involved in litigation. A
litigation situation usually produces a losing party,
and the loss can involve anything from large
amounts of money to the loss of an individual's
liberty and reputation.4 2 A police officer's actions
36

In addition to prosecutors, there are other quasi-

judicial officers that are accorded absolute immunity. See
Silver v. Dickson, 403 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1968) (state
parole board members); Clark v. Washington, 366 F.2d
678, 681 (9th Cir. 1966) (state bar association members
in disciplining members of the bar); Turpen v. Booth, 56
Cal. 65, 69 (1880) (grand jurors).
37 Police officers and prosecutors often arrive at the
scene of a crime together and work closely on the subsequent investigation. See 2 MANUAL FOR PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS 432 (M. Ploscowe ed. 1956); Barrett, Police Practices and Law - From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 CALIF. L.
REv. 11, 21 (1962). In fact, the Forsyth case involved a
wiretap ordered by an Attorney General but executed by
FBI agents. 599 F.2d at 1205.
38
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967). In
addition, federal "police officers" such as FBI agents also
receive qualified immunity. Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
3 386 U.S. at 555.
40 For example, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972), the court determined whether a police officer should be absolutely immune from suit. After a discussion of the proper way of
analyzing the question, the court concluded, without
explanation, that "the benefit to society derived from the
protection of personal liberties outweighs the detriment
of perhaps deterring vigorous police action." Id. at 1346.
4' Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 512.
42 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 348.

[Vol. 71

can produce at most a temporary loss of privacy or
an injury. In addition, a police officer's activities
are only subject to judicial review if the case he
was working on goes to trial and there is a suppression hearing in which his investigative methods
are challenged as the basis for excluding the evidence he has gathered.43 In all other situations, a
citizen is powerless to challenge a police officer's
actions except in a civil suit. The actions of a
prosecutor and a judge, on the other hand, are
always subject to the rigors of an adversary procedure with appellate review. The special considerations that justify granting absolute immunity to
judicial and quasi-judicial officers stem from the
trial situation and are thus not present in police
activities.44
An attempt to determine the proper scope of
immunity for the United States Attorney General
must begin by analyzing the functions he performs
in light of the relevant policy considerations. It
must first be determined whether there is a likelihood of a great number of retaliatory suits that
may affect the Attorney General's performance or
waste too much of his time and, in addition,
whether there are sufficient controls over his activity to act as an alternative protection for citizens.
The Forsyth opinion presents two separate questions. First, one must determine whether the distinction the court drew between general and specific investigations is viable in light of the policy
considerations. Second, if it is not a viable distinction, what sort of immunity should investigative
activities be accorded?
The Forsyth opinion establishes two categories of
investigations-the specific and the general. The
first point to consider is whether specific investigations will generate a greater number of retaliatory suits than general investigations. It can be
argued that a specific investigation, with the added
threat of prosecution, might generate more hostility
than a general investigation. But this argument
43 The most common means of challenging a police
officer's actions is a pretrial motion to suppress illegally
seized evidence. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 12 (4th ed. 1974).
" Some commentators have presented alternative explanations for the fact that police officers are only afforded a qualified immunity. One commentator has argued that as the rank of an official increases, he will be
more aware of the total situation and thus more cautious
in his actions. In addition, higher officials are more
subject to public opinion. Developments in the Law-Remedies
Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REv.
827, 835-36 (1957). This explanation is refuted by the
case of Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 233 (1974), where
the governor of a state was given only qualified immunity.
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does not withstand close analysis. First of all, in a official can determine, in advance, that he is progreat many situations, it is doubtful that the sub- tected from all lawsuits.
Furthermore, the grant of absolute immunity to
jects of an investigation will be aware of its purpose.
investigations will not save the Attorney
specific
the
where
situations
in
be
true
will
This often
General any court time. The Forsyth court was
prosecutor ordered a specific investigation but
remand the cases for a "limited factual
eventually chose not to prosecute. Even in situa- forced to
' 46
to determine what kind of investigation
hearing
tions where a prosecution is eventually initiated, it
the Attorney General had ordered. Given the comis impossible to determine a priori whether specific
investigations will in fact produce a greater number plexity of all modern day courtroom proceedings,
of retaliatory suits than general investigations. It is it will almost certainly take a great deal of time
quite simple to hypothesize a situation where the just to determine what sort of investigation was
opposite could be true. A prosecutor might be ordered. A grant of absolute immunity will only
about to proceed with a prosecution, but be in save a public official's time if it can be used to
need of one additional piece of information. To dismiss suits on the basis of the pleadings. Since
gain this piece of information, he may need to tap the grant of absolute immunity solely to specific
investigations will not eliminate a significant
one phone for a one-day period. But a prosecutor
of wasted court time for the Attorney
amount
could conduct a general investigation of someone's
there can be no justification for protecting
General,
activities that might include placing a tap on all of
47
a person's private and business phones for several him from suits based on malicious conduct.
indicate
do
not
considerations
the
policy
Since
months. To some, the first type of investigation,
with the added threat of a prosecution, may prove a basis for distinguishing between general and
more offensive than a general investigation. But it specific investigations, all investigations ought to
is also likely that many people would find the be treated uniformly. This conclusion is further
general investigation, without any threat of a pros- supported by the pragmatic problems caused by
ecution, far more offensive. The only reasonable attempting to draw a distinction based on a prosconclusion to draw from this is that it is impossible ecutor's motive. in ordering an investigation. Most
to tell, absent some overwhelming empirical evi- courts that have approached this question have
dence, whether specific investigations will provoke recognized this and held that a prosecutor does not
a greater number of retaliatory suits than general act as a quasi-judicial officer in conducting investigations and should therefore only receive qualiinvestigations.
48
If it cannot be said with a reasonable degree of fied immunity. This viewpoint appears to be
certainty that specific investigations will provoke a justified by the relevant policy considerations.
In Butz v. Economou the Supreme Court held that
greater number of retaliatory suits, there can be no
justification for giving a different degree of im- "federal executive officials exercising discretion are
munity to specific as opposed to general investiga- entitled only to the qualified immunity specified
tions. But even assuming one could prove that in Scheuer, subject to those exceptional situations
specific investigations would provoke greater hos- where it is demonstrated that absolute immunity
''
of public business."
tility than general investigations, the Forsyth dis- is essential for the conduct
tinction would still not be justified. Courts have Investigative activity is not an exceptional situation
been concerned that a large number of retaliatory mandating the use of absolute immunity. Although
suits could have two effects on a public official:
46599 F.2d at 1215.
they might affect his performance and they might
47 The Forsyth court recognized this argument when it
waste too much of his time.45 But if absolute im- pointed out that the factual hearing "may result in some
munity is granted to only specific investigations, dilution of the protection of absolute immunity." Id.
48 See note 8 supra. One commentator argued that all
neither of these two problems will be solved. The
conducted by a prosecutor ought to receive
investigations
Forsyth distinction is so vague that it is doubtful an absolute immunity. Note, Delimiting the Scope of ProsecutoAttorney General will be able to predict, with rial Immunity from Section 1983 Damage Suits, 52 N.Y.U. L.
confidence, into what category an investigation REv. 173 (1977). The author makes a two-part argument.
falls. Except in a few obvious situations, he will First, a prosecutor's investigative and quasi-judicial activseparation
have to assume that a court may find his activity ity are so deeply entwined that a meaningful
is impossible. Id. at 198-99. Second, if any distinction is
to be a general investigation with only qualified possible, it will be based on a prosecutor's intent. Since
immunity. Absolute immunity is only an effective a determination of intent requires a hearing, a fundaprotection of an official's performance if the public mental purpose of the absolute immunity is thwarted. Id.
at 200.
45
See text accompanying notes 25-30.
49 438 U.S. at 507 (footnote omitted).

NOTES

investigative activity is likely to stimulate some
retaliatory response, it is not likely to generate the
same reaction that a trial situation does. When the
Bradley Court discussed the reasons for granting
absolute immunity to the Attorney General, it
consistently pointed to the unique aspects of a trial
and the likelihood that a losing litigant might seek
another forum to vent his anger. 5° The Imbler Court
also pointed out the particular resentment that
results from being prosecuted. 5' Additionally, the
adversary nature of the trial and the possibility of
appellate review provide a viable means of controlling litigation activity, but they do not protect
the public against improper investigative activity.
All public officials can potentially generate some
antagonism, but it is the unique aspects of a trial
situation that can generate the unusually high
number of retaliatory
suits necessary to justify
5 2
absolute immunity.
This discussion demonstrates the continued viability of the common-law distinction between the
immunity appropriate for police officers and for
judges. When a prosecutor investigates, he acts as
a policeman and should only receive qualified
immunity. This conclusion is further supported by
the functional approach to the immunity question
mandated by the Imbler opinion. If one is to determine the propriety of a grant of immunity on the
basis of the function being performed, all investigations, whether ordered by an Attorney General
or conducted by a police officer, should logically
be treated uniformly.
5°80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 348.

5 424 U.S. at 425.
52
See text accompanying notes 40-41.
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The Forsyth holding would permit a situation in
which an Attorney General would be absolutely
immune for ordering an investigation where an
FBI agent would receive only qualified immunity.
The Butz Court, in refusing to grant absolute immunity to all federal executive officials, discussed
precisely this problem and pointed out that "[I]t
makes little sense to hold that a Government agent
is liable for warrantless and forcible entry into a
citizen's home in pursuit of evidence, but that an
official of higher rank who actually orders such a
burglary is immune simply because of his greater
authority."-'
The Supreme Court has carefully laid the foundation for a uniform system of immunity that looks
only to the function a public official is performing,
not his rank or position. In Scheuer the Court demonstrated this new approach by holding that the
highest executive official of a state, its governor,
was entitled only to the same qualified immunity
that a police officer received,54 and in Butz the
Court held that federal officials should receive the
same level of immunity as their state counterparts.55 The Forsyth decision, on the other hand,
has established a special privilege for the Attorney
General and prosecutors in general that is directly
opposed to the functional approach the Court applied.
438 U.S. at 505-06.
416 U.S. at 245-48. The Court noted that the scope
of qualified immunity may vary with the level of discretion exercised by the public official. In essence, this means
that the degree of immunity will be the same for all
officials performing the same function, but what constitutes good faith will vary.
' 438 U.S. at 300-0 1.
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